PUBLICATIONS

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Accepted/Published

2022. ‘Brutalist Fundamentalism: Radical and Moderate‘ – Synthese

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Here I argue for a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature.

2022. “Fundamentality and Minimalist Grounding Laws“- Philosophical Studies

The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws.

2021. “The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers” – Acta Analytica

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. I show that various ways of explicating the fundamentality of fundamental powers have more drawbacks than merits. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options.

2021. ” Pure Powers are not Powerful Qualities” – European Journal of Analytic Philosophy

I defend an ontologically robust distinction between pure powers and powerful qualities. To accomplish this aim, I show that the collapse between pure powers and powerful qualities can be resisted. I conclude by drawing some positive implications of this result.

2021. “Grounding Ontic Structuralism” w/Bianchi, S. (IUSS Pavia) – Synthese

Abstract. A respectable assessment of priority-based Ontic Structuralism demands an elucidation of its metaphysical backbone. Our purpose is to show that grounding is the best competitor to articulate this view and regiment its theses in a desirable unified way.

Abstract. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entities does not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of grounding.

Abstract. . My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.

In Preparation

  • A paper on the metaphysics of the grounding laws
  • A paper on causal powers and the universe as a vast entangled system
  • A paper on grounding interventionism and difference-making
  • A paper powers and artificial dispositions
  • A paper on grounding explanation in science