My work focuses primarily on the metaphysics of science. I am interested in the basic concepts and categories that we invoke to describe the world as we find it in scientific investigation and everyday life. It is my belief that an adequate metaphysical theory must be scientifically-informed. As such, philosophical inquiry should go in hand with scientific theorizing.
In print and my PhD thesis, I defend a novel version of fundamental powerful qualities. These are properties that simultaneously endow their bearers with distinctive dispositions and contribute to their characteristic appearance. I argue that my own version of powerful qualities gives us an account of fundamental properties which is metaphysically satisfactory and yet befitting of current science.
At present, I am pursuing a number of publications projects on the metaphysics of powerful qualities. I am also exploring the philosophical ramifications of dispositional essentialism—the view that the fundamental properties of our world are essentially dispositional or powerful.
Another important strand of my research is the topic of fundamentality. Metaphorically speaking, the fundamental is everything that God would have to create in order to bring into existence everything else that exists. Currently, I am investigating two related questions: (1) Can we analyse adequately the fundamental in terms of other metaphysical notions such as grounding or ontological dependence? (2) What is the most adequate conception of fundamentality to make sense of the scientific picture of the world?
In recent times, I’ve become increasingly convinced that some form of ontic structuralism is true. So, I am researching on whether the notion of metaphysical grounding can illuminate this view. I wish to defend the thesis that the physical structures posited by our best theories are fundamental in the sense of being ungrounded, and they are prior to objects in the sense that the latter are grounded in them.