PUBLICATIONS

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Accepted/Published

Forthcoming. Not so Powerful Pure Powers. Analisis Filosofico

Forthcoming. with Méndez Mateluna, María Pía &, Una Introducción no Imparcial a la Fundamentación Metafísica: Determinación y Fundamentalidad. Introduccion a la Filosofia Analitica.

This chapter aspires to be an opinionated, partial, and Latinamerican version of Kit Fine’s seminal “Guide to Ground”.

2024. Michel Ghins: Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers. Cham: Springer (Synthese Library, volume 483), 2024, 224pp., €128.39 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-3-031-54226-8. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie.

A review article of Ghins’s latest book.

2024. Grounding Perspectivalism: Metaphysical Explanation in the Eye of the Beholder. FACSA repository

This conference paper explores perspectivalism about metaphysical grounding.

2024. Moderate Dispositional Structuralism. FACSA repository.

This unrevised paper combines the powerful qualities view with ontic structuralism.

2024. Powerful Qualities for Strongly Emergent Mental Properties. FACSA repository.

This withdrawn paper has been accepted for inclusion in the Faculty of Sociales Sciences and Arts’ archive.

2024. Ways of Grounding: Enabling and Generation. Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso.

I argue that some extant strategies for establishing an enabling relation irreducible to grounding fails.

2024. El Deber de Adoptar y los Derechos de la Niñez en Chile. Revista Iberoamericana, 24 (86).

In this short opinion piece, I suggest that if we have a duty to adopt (as I think some of us do), then Chilean policymakers should think of how to build a legal enviroments this duty’s fulfillment.

2024. Kortabarria, Markel & Giannotti, Joaquim (2024). Scientific Explanation as a Guide to Ground. Synthese 203 (3):1-27.

Markel and I argue that ground is a useful tool for doing naturalistic metaphysics and that a certain form of scientific explanation is a better guide than metaphysical explanation to instances of ground.

2024. ‘Is There a Metaphysically Robust Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Dispositions?‘ – In William A. Bauer & Anna Marmodoro (eds.), Artificial Dispositions: Investigating Ethical and Metaphysical Issues. Bloomsbury

I argue against the view that there is a metaphysically robust distinction between natural and artificial dispositions.

2024. ‘The Special Power-Composition Question and the Powerful Cosmos‘ – In Christopher J. Austin, Anna Marmodoro & Andrea Roselli (eds.), Powers, Parts and Wholes: Essays on the Mereology of Powers, Routledge

I explore an unexpected consequence of a moderate answer to the special power-composition question: namely, the existence of an object composed of all the compossible fundamental powers in the universe.

2022. ‘Brutalist Fundamentalism: Radical and Moderate‘ – Synthese

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Here I argue for a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature.

2022. “Fundamentality and Minimalist Grounding Laws“- Philosophical Studies

The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws.

2021. “The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers” – Acta Analytica

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. I show that various ways of explicating the fundamentality of fundamental powers have more drawbacks than merits. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options.

2021. ” Pure Powers are not Powerful Qualities” – European Journal of Analytic Philosophy

I defend an ontologically robust distinction between pure powers and powerful qualities. To accomplish this aim, I show that the collapse between pure powers and powerful qualities can be resisted. I conclude by drawing some positive implications of this result.

2021. “Grounding Ontic Structuralism” w/Bianchi, S. (IUSS Pavia) – Synthese

Abstract. A respectable assessment of priority-based Ontic Structuralism demands an elucidation of its metaphysical backbone. Our purpose is to show that grounding is the best competitor to articulate this view and regiment its theses in a desirable unified way.

Abstract. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entities does not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of grounding.

Abstract. . My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.

In Preparation

  • A paper on the metaphysics of the grounding laws
  • A paper on causal powers and the universe as a vast entangled system
  • A paper on grounding interventionism and difference-making
  • A paper powers and artificial dispositions
  • A paper on grounding explanation in science